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he Eurosystem comprises the European Central Bank at its center as
well as the national central banks of the twelve countries currently
participating in monetary union.1 The European Central Bank was
established in July 1998, six months before the beginning of Stage Three of
economic and monetary union. Although decisions regarding monetary
policy are made centrally by the Governing Council2 of the Eurosystem, the
operationalaspectsofmonetarypolicy—includingopenmarketoperations,
administration of the minimum reserve system, and management of the
standing facilities—are undertaken in a decentralized fashion at the twelve
nationalcentralbanks.ThemainfeaturesoftheEurosystem’soperatingpro-
cedures are similar in many respects to those employed by the Bundesbank
and other national central banks in the euro area in recent years.
Total assets of the Eurosystem as of December 2000 were about
836,000 million euros. Of these assets, lending to the financial sector,
which was primarily in the form of repurchase operations, amounted to
about 270,000 million euros—about one-third. The remaining assets are
predominantly gold (about 14 percent), foreign currency claims (about 30
percent), euro-denominated securities (10 percent), and other assets (also
10 percent). Holdings of foreign currency claims in large part reflect the
foreign exchange reserves of the Eurosystem; with the start of the
European Monetary Union (EMU), all foreign exchange reserves in the
euro area are held by the national central banks (NCBs), except for a frac-
tion amounting to about 40 billion euros which the NCBs transferred
directly to the European Central Bank (ECB). No foreign exchange
reserves are held by euro-area finance ministries or treasury departments.26 Second Quarter 2002 New England Economic Review
Policy Objective of the ECB
As specified in the Maastricht Treaty, the primary
objective of the ECB is to “maintain price stability.”
The published definition of price stability is inflation
of below 2 percent, measured as the twelve-month
change in the harmonized index of consumer prices.
In setting monetary policy, the Governing Council
considers incoming information under two “pillars”:
the growth in a euro-area monetary aggregate in rela-
tion to a published “reference value,” and a mix of
other euro-area indicators defined as a “broadly based
assessment of the outlook for future price develop-
ments.” Among other things, this second pillar
includes wages, bond prices, the yield curve, meas-
ures of real activity, business and consumer confi-
dence, and the exchange rate. The ECB’s focus in set-
ting monetary policy is on area-wide price develop-
ments and activity, and not on developments in indi-
vidual countries. The Maastricht Treaty grants the
ECB full constitutional independence. It explicitly
states that neither the ECB nor any member of its deci-
sion-making bodies shall seek or take instructions
from European Commission institutions, from any




The Eurosystem provides liquidity to the euro-
area banking system primarily through a weekly
refinancing operation with a two-week maturity.
This operation provides approximately 70 percent of
the liquidity needs of the euro-area banking system.
Additional liquidity is provided through longer-
term monthly tenders that are conducted as vari-
able-rate tenders with a three-month maturity; these
tenders provide the bulk of the remaining needed
liquidity.
Beginning with its first weekly tender settled on
January 7, 1999, and up until June 28, 2000, the ECB
offered only fixed-rate tenders at its weekly refi-
nancing operations. This choice soon came under
question when, at a typical Eurosystem refinancing
operation, the amount bid far exceeded the amount
allotted. As of late 1999, the resulting allotment rate
was about 5 percent. The extent of overbidding
became even more pronounced in 2000; by May
2000, the allotment rate averaged about 1 percent.4
Euro-area credit institutions had an incentive to bid
heavily for funds at the refinancing rate: The refi-
nancing rate was generally lower than the euro-area
overnight interbank interest rate average (Eonia),
credit institutions were not restricted in the amount
they could bid at a refinancing operation, and they
were required to have collateral to cover only the
actual amount allocated. By late May 2000, the
aggregate amount bid in the refinancing operations
exceeded estimates of total available collateral in the
euro-area banking system.5
In June 2000, the ECB announced that, effective
June 28, it would switch to using a variable-rate tender
for its main refinancing operations. The ECB currently
makes awards under an American-style auction, fill-
ing bids in descending order of the rate offered. The
ECB announces a minimum bid rate, which serves as
the primary tool to signal the ECB’s policy stance.
Since the switch to the variable rate tender, the allot-
ment rate at the weekly refinancing operation has
averaged a little over 60 percent, suggesting that the
overbidding phenomenon was successfully removed
by the new procedures.
1 The term European System of Central Banks (ESCB) includes
the ECB and the national central banks of all fifteen European Union
members. The national central banks of the member states that do
not participate in the Eurosystem are members of the ESCB but have
a special status; they are allowed to conduct their respective nation-
al monetary policies, and they do not take part in the decision-mak-
ing regarding euro-area policy and its implementation. Initially,
eleven countries adopted the single currency (the euro) in January
1999; Greece became the twelfth member effective January 2001.
2 The decision-making bodies of the ECB are the Executive
Board and the Governing Council.The Executive Board consists of
the president and vice president of the ECB along with four other
members. They are appointed by common agreement among the
governments of the European Monetary Union (EMU) member
states. The members of the Executive Board are also members of the
Governing Council, along with the governors of the central banks of
the twelve countries that have adopted the single currency. The pri-
mary responsibility of the Governing Council is the setting of mone-
tary policy within the euro area. The primary responsibility of the
Executive Committee is to implement monetary policy and to issue
instructions as necessary to the national central banks. 
3 See “The Single Monetary Policy in Stage Three: General
Documentation on ESCB Monetary Policy Instruments and
Procedures.” The European Central Bank, November 2000.
4 ECB Monthly Bulletins, table 1.1.
5 ECB officials noted early in 1999 that the overbidding and
resulting low allotment ratio needed to be addressed. For example,
ECB President Duisenberg noted at the March 4, 1999, press confer-
ence that “the phenomenon that the allotment percentage of the refi-
nancing operations is very low and has even tended to become
smaller, week after week, is a matter of concern.” Options suggested
to resolve the situation included switching to a variable rate tender,
requiring banks to offer collateral at the point of placing bids as had
been the procedure at the Bundesbank, setting a bidding limit for
market participants, and announcing a minimum allotment ratio
before the tender.Second Quarter 2002 New England Economic Review 27
Standing Facilities
The Eurosystem also has two standing facilities 
to provide and absorb overnight money and to pro-
vide a corridor for the market-determined overnight
interbank rate: the marginal lending facility and the
deposit facility. The marginal lending facility provides
overnight credit to all eligible credit institutions with
sufficient collateral, and its interest rate usually serves
as a ceiling for the overnight interbank rate. There is
no stigma associated with borrowing at the marginal
lending facility. However, such borrowing takes place
at a penalty rate, in that the interest rate on the mar-
ginal lending facility is generally set 100 basis points
above the minimum bid rate for the weekly refinanc-
ing tender. The overnight interbank rate usually trades
close to the weekly refinancing rate, giving banks an
incentive to borrow in the interbank market if possi-
ble. Intraday credit that is not repaid by the end of the
day automatically rolls over to overnight lending
through the marginal lending facility.
The second standing facility, the deposit facility,
usually provides a floor for the interbank rate. This
facility is available for banks to deposit excess funds
that earn interest, although excess funds are not auto-
matically swept into this facility. Normally, the inter-
est rate on the deposit facility is 100 basis points
below the minimum bid rate. Thus, in normal times,
the corridor provided by the marginal lending and
deposit facilities is quite wide, at about 2 percent.
From January 4 through January 21, 1999, however,
interest rates on the two standing facilities were set
only 50 basis points apart, 25 basis points on either
side of the refinancing rate, to help ease distortions in
the money market during the initial weeks of opera-
tions under the single currency. Normally, use of the
marginal lending facility is limited and supplies less
than 0.5 percent of total lending to the euro-area
banking system.6
Fine-Tuning Operations
The ECB may also conduct fine-tuning operations
to make further adjustments to the amount of liquidity
in the market, although such operations are rare.
Additional instruments available for fine-tuning oper-
ations include outright open market purchases of tier-
one assets (see below) and foreign exchange swaps.
The ECB’s November 2000 documentation does not
specify what currencies it would use for such swaps
but notes that it would operate only in “widely traded
currencies and in accordance with accepted practice.”
Structural Liquidity-Providing Operations
The ECB may also conduct structural operations to
increase or absorb the amount of liquidity normally
provided to the banking system. It may do so in the
form of reverse transactions or outright purchases. Such
operations are also rare. In practice, the ECB tends first
to increase liquidity provided through the main refi-
nancing operations. If it determines that the increased
liquidity demand is not temporary, it will increase the
amount provided through the longer-term refinancing
operations. The amount typically provided through the
longer-term refinancing operations has risen from
about 15 billion euros each month in 1999—which
results in an outstanding level of about 45 billion euros
because these operations have a three-month maturi-
ty—to about 20 billion euros per month subsequently.
Eligible Counterparties
Counterparties to the Eurosystem’s operations
(including open market operations and use of the
standing facilities) must fulfill eligibility criteria set by
the Eurosystem. First, only institutions subject to the
minimum reserve system are eligible. Counterparties
must also be financially sound and should be subject
to harmonized supervision by national authorities.7 In
the case of branches of institutions headquartered out-
side the euro area, they may be subject to nonharmo-
nized supervision of a comparable standard. In addi-
tion, the November 2000 General Documentation
notes that “counterparties must fulfil any operational
criteria specified in the relevant contractual or regula-
tory arrangements applied by the respective national
central bank or the ECB so as to ensure the efficient
conduct of ESCB monetary policy operations.”
According to the ECB’s Annual Report 2000, out of the
approximately 7,500 euro-area credit institutions sub-
ject to the minimum reserve system, about 3,600 had
access to the deposit facility, about 3,000 to the margin-
al lending facility, and about 2,500 could participate in
standard open market operations. A limited group of
about 200 institutions are eligible for fine-tuning oper-
6Use was higher (averaging a little under 3 percent of total
Eurosystem lending to the financial sector) during January 1999,
when the corridor was only 50 basis points wide. The marginal 
lending facility was also used fairly heavily over the century-date-
change weekend. Although, in general, use of the standing facilities
is limited, some use does occur almost every day. 
7 The ECB itself makes no judgment on the soundness of credit
institutions; this is the responsibility of the individual national
supervisory bodies.28 Second Quarter 2002 New England Economic Review
ations. There is no particular significance to the fact
that nearly two-thirds of the depository institutions do
not have access to the standing facilities.8
Collateral
All credit operations of the Eurosystem (includ-
ing access to the marginal lending facility) must be
backed by sufficient collateral. The ECB designates
collateral by two tiers. Tier one includes marketable
euro-denominated debt instruments that fulfill uni-
form area-wide eligibility criteria specified by the
ECB. Tier two consists of additional euro-denominat-
ed marketable and nonmarketable assets that are of
particular importance to national banking systems
and financial markets. The establishment of two tiers
of collateral reflects the differences across NCBs of
countries going into the euro area in the eligibility cri-
teria for assets used in credit operations. In some
countries, eligible assets were restricted to public debt
and central bank instruments only, whereas other cen-
tral banks accepted a broader range, including high-
quality marketable and nonmarketable securities
issued by banks and corporations. The ECB decided
that full harmonization of practices before the start 
of the Monetary Union was neither practical—in part
because the determination of which countries would
be participating would not be known until fairly late
in Stage Two—nor necessary for the efficient conduct
of monetary policy. No distinction is made between
the two types of collateral with regard to their eligibil-
ity for Eurosystem monetary operations, although
only tier one assets are eligible for use in outright
operations. To assure that information on the current
list of eligible assets is readily available to all parties,
the ECB lists eligible securities for tier one and tier
two collateral weekly on its web site. 
In practice, almost all collateral used by banks in
the euro area is tier one, although the proportion has
decreased a bit over time from about 98 percent in the
early months of 1999 to about 96 percent in 2000.9
General government securities make up a little over
half of the eligible tier one assets; this share has
declined from about 60 percent in early 1999 to about
56 percent in March 2000, in part reflecting the
increased issuance of euro-denominated corporate
securities. About 30 percent of eligible tier one assets
are issued by credit institutions, with the residual
issued by corporations. However, counterparties
appear to pledge a higher proportion of securities
issued by credit institutions: General government
securities account for only about 47 percent of collater-
al pledged, about the same share as for securities
issued by credit institutions.
The slight increase in use of tier two assets over
time and the decrease in the share of government secu-
rities suggests that euro-area credit institutions have
some preference for using less liquid securities as 
collateral for their transactions with the Eurosystem.
Mastroeni (2000) notes that most marketable debt
securities that are included in tier two are not actively
traded in secondary markets. Liquidity of these instru-
ments is low, as their issue size is small and they tend
to be held by investors until maturity. Tier one securi-
ties issued by credit institutions as a rule are also
somewhat less liquid than are government bonds.
Valuation and Risk Management
There are also differences across euro-area nation-
al central banks in their collateral management sys-
tems, with some using earmarking systems where
each asset is specifically predeposited for a certain
amount of credit, and some using systems where the
asset pool in general is put forward. In pooling sys-
tems, tier one assets are subject to daily valuation. In
earmarking systems, the valuation is carried out at
least on a weekly basis, where the settlement date of
the main refinancing operation is a valuation date. The
Eurosystem applies an initial margin of 1 percent for
intraday and overnight liquidity-providing transac-
tions, and 2 percent for transactions with a longer
maturity. In addition to the initial margins, haircuts are
applied according to residual maturity of the asset.
Haircuts for tier one assets are determined by the ECB;
they range from 0 percent for assets with a residual
maturity of less than one year to 5 percent for zero
coupon bonds and strips with a residual maturity of
more than seven years. Valuation haircuts for tier two
assets are determined by the relevant national central
bank and are at least as stringent as those applied to
tier one assets. No initial margins or haircuts are
applied to liquidity-absorbing operations. 
8 Apparently, the majority of institutions have not found it nec-
essary or convenient to obtain such access, just as a large fraction of
depository institutions in the United States have not filed the neces-
sary documentation to borrow at the discount window. 
9Details on eligible collateral and collateral used are taken
from Orazio Mastroeni, 2000, “The Collateral Framework of the
Eurosystem: Some Evidence in the First Months of the European
Monetary Union.” This paper was prepared for the ECB’s confer-
ence on the operational framework of the Eurosystem and financial
markets, held May 5–6, 2000. 